Note: Discussions about Sweden’s future religious makeup are highly controversial. Predictions of a “majority Muslim” Sweden have fueled heated debates in political, academic, and public spheres, with critics arguing that such projections oversimplify complex demographic, social, and policy factors. This is a highly controversial subject and this article only aims to provide a purely scientific perspective on the matter using statistics and mathematics, it is up to the reader to interpret and attach value to.

Sweden’s history is as complex as it is fascinating. For centuries, the region now known as Sweden was steeped in Norse pagan traditions, with its people worshiping the Æsir at revered sites like the Temple at Uppsala. With the Christianization of the 11th century, Sweden gradually transitioned to Catholicism. Later, following the Protestant Reformation in the 1530s, Lutheranism became the dominant—and eventually state—religion. In more recent decades, however, Sweden has emerged as one of the most secularized countries in the world, with low rates of church attendance and a high percentage of the population identifying as non-religious.

At the same time, Sweden’s modern experience with Muslim communities began in the mid-20th century. Although contact with the Muslim world dates back to the Viking Age, the first officially recognized Muslim groups, such as the Finnish Tatars, arrived in the 1940s. The establishment of the first Muslim congregation in Gothenburg in 1949 by the Ahmadiyya community marked a significant milestone. Subsequent decades saw labor migrants from Turkey and the Balkans arriving in the 1960s. Over the ensuing decades, successive waves of refugees and immigrants further transformed the country’s demographic landscape. Notably, around 2015 a substantial increase in immigration from the Middle East occurred as a result of the Syrian civil war, the instability in Iraq, and conflicts in other regions. These events drove a surge of asylum seekers and refugees into Sweden, adding to the existing Muslim population and contributing to its rapid growth.

Political Shifts in Europe
In recent years, many European nations have witnessed a marked shift to the right in their political landscapes. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats have grown in influence by tapping into concerns over immigration, integration, and the impact on the welfare state. Similarly, in France, right-wing parties like the National Rally (formerly the National Front) have capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiment and skepticism about multiculturalism. In Germany, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has similarly reflected public unease over immigration and cultural change. These political trends have not only influenced domestic policies but also added fuel to the debates on demographic changes and the future religious composition of these countries.

The Numbers Behind the Debate: A Scientific and Mathematical Analysis
Current Figures:
• Muslim Population: ~810,000 (about 8.1% of Sweden’s 10‑million population)
• Non-Muslim (Native/Other) Population: ~9,190,000

Immigration Trends:
• During a period of high inflow, roughly 300,000 Muslim migrants arrived over a six-year span—about 50,000 per year.
• This significant annual boost has contributed to the rising Muslim share of the population.

Fertility Rates:
• Muslim Couples: On average, about 2.9 children per woman
• Ethnically Swedish Families: Approximately 1.7 children per woman
• The higher fertility rate among Muslim families, combined with continued immigration, means that the Muslim population is growing both through natural increase and influx from abroad, while the native (non-Muslim) population grows at a modest rate.

Scenario 1: High Immigration
Let’s first assume that current trends continue with high immigration:

• Immigration Contribution: 50,000 new Muslim immigrants per year (roughly a 6.2% “add-on” relative to the current Muslim population of 810,000)
• Natural Growth: Adds about 1.1% per year
• Total Effective Annual Growth for Muslims: Approximately 7.3% per year

Meanwhile, assume the non-Muslim population grows slowly—around 0.7% per year—reflecting low fertility and modest net migration among ethnic Swedes.

Using exponential growth models:

Under these assumptions, Muslims would equal the non-Muslim population in about 38–40 years from now—with majority status emerging shortly thereafter (around the late 2050s).

Scenario 2: Halved Immigration
Now, suppose that future immigration slows, with only 25,000 Muslim immigrants arriving each year—half the previous rate. In this case:

• Immigration Contribution: Approximately 25,000/810,000 ≈ 3.1% per year
• Natural Growth Remains: About 1.1% per year
• Total Effective Growth for Muslims: Approximately 4.2% per year

Keeping the non-Muslim growth rate at about 0.7% per year, our model becomes:

With halved immigration, it would take roughly 70 years for the Muslim population to reach parity with the non-Muslims—implying majority status in the early-to-mid 2090s.

Scenario 3: Low Immigration (Level of Poland)
In a third scenario, we assume that future immigration of Muslims to Sweden slows to levels similar to those seen in Poland—a country with very low Muslim immigration. For the purpose of this model, let’s assume that only about 5,000 Muslim immigrants arrive per year. This represents an annual immigration boost of roughly 0.62% relative to the current Muslim population (5,000/810,000).

If we continue to assume that natural growth (i.e. the excess of births over deaths) among Muslim families contributes about 1.1% per year, the total effective annual growth rate of the Muslim population would be about 1.72% (1.1% + 0.62%).

Meanwhile, we assume the non-Muslim (primarily ethnically Swedish) population grows at a modest rate of about 0.7% per year.

Using a simplified exponential model:

Under this scenario, it would take roughly 245 years for the Muslim population to equal the non-Muslim population—and majority status would occur only thereafter.

Full Overview of Scenarios
• Scenario 1: High Immigration – Assuming 50,000 new Muslim immigrants per year along with natural growth, the Muslim population grows at about 7.3% per year. This simple model suggests parity in about 38–40 years (late 2050s).
• Scenario 2: Halved Immigration – With immigration reduced to 25,000 per year (plus natural growth), the effective growth rate is about 4.2% per year. In this case, parity is reached in about 70 years (early-to-mid 2090s).
• Scenario 3: Low Immigration (Level of Poland) – If immigration drops further to around 5,000 per year, the total growth rate becomes about 1.72% per year. Here, the model projects parity in roughly 245 years.

Caveats and Considerations
These projections are highly tentative and depend on several assumptions:
• Immigration Trends: Future immigration levels can vary significantly due to global events and domestic policies.
• Fertility Convergence: Over time, the fertility rates of immigrant populations often converge toward those of the host society, which could slow natural growth.
• Non-Muslim Growth: Changes in the native population’s growth rate may also affect the timeline.
• Emigration: There is also evidence that ethnically Swedish citizens are increasingly emigrating to other countries, which could further dampen the growth of the non-Muslim population.
• Complex Socio-Economic Factors: Integration, emigration, economic conditions, and political factors all play roles that are not captured in a simple model.
• Religious Conversion Dynamics: The projections assume static religious affiliations; however, shifts in personal beliefs could alter the future landscape. For example, some ethnically Swedish natives might convert to Islam, or conversely, some Muslims might secularize or convert to Christianity. Such conversion dynamics are difficult to predict but could significantly impact the trajectory of religious composition over time.

In Conclusion
Sweden’s rich history—from its pagan roots and Christian transformations to modern secularism—sets the stage for its latest demographic evolution. Under a high immigration scenario (50,000 newcomers per year), a simplified model suggests that Muslims could become the majority in Sweden in roughly 40 years. However, if immigration slows by half (25,000 per year), the model projects parity in about 70 years, with majority status following thereafter. If immigration slows even further to levels seen in Poland, parity may not occur until roughly 245 years from now.

• Under a high immigration scenario (50,000 newcomers per year), a simplified model suggests Muslims could become the majority in Sweden in roughly 40 years.
• With immigration halved (25,000 per year), parity might be reached in about 70 years.
• If immigration slows even further to levels seen in Poland (about 5,000 per year), parity may not occur until roughly 245 years from now.

While these estimates offer a rough idea based on current trends, the true future will be shaped by many complex, interrelated factors. This analysis should be viewed as a thought experiment—a way to stimulate discussion on a highly controversial and politically charged subject rather than as a definitive prediction.

References:

References 1. **Muslim Population in Sweden:** – Pew Research Center. (2017). “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050.” Retrieved from [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewresearch.org). – Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB). (2021). “Population, by religion, age, and sex.” Retrieved from [Statistics Sweden](https://www.scb.se). 2. **Immigration Trends in Sweden:** – Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket). (2020). “Annual Report on Immigration and Refugees.” Retrieved from [Swedish Migration Agency](https://www.migrationsverket.se). – Baksi, J. (2018). “Historical Immigration into Sweden: Changes in Patterns and Policies.” Swedish Institute for Migration and Integration. 3. **Fertility Rates:** – Statistics Sweden. (2020). “Fertility Rates by Country of Birth, Gender, and Age.” Retrieved from [Statistics Sweden](https://www.scb.se). – Pew Research Center. (2018). “The Demographics of Islam: Data and Visuals on Muslim Populations.” Retrieved from [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewresearch.org). 4. **Sweden’s Religious Landscape and Secularization:** – Nielsen, J. (2019). “Religious Transition in Scandinavian Countries: From Christianity to Secularism.” *Journal of Scandinavian Studies*, 56(2), 85-104. – Pew Research Center. (2020). “The Future of Religious Departures and Change in Europe.” Retrieved from [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewresearch.org). 5. **Rightward Political Shifts in Europe:** – Eurobarometer. (2019). “Public Opinion in Europe: Political and Social Dynamics since 2000.” Retrieved from [Eurobarometer](https://europa.eu/eurobarometer). – Schwierz, C. (2020). “The Rise of Populism and Its Influence on Immigration in Europe.” *European Political Studies* 67(3), 45-62. 6. **Immigration Data Before 2000:** – Statistics Sweden (SCB). (2000). “Migration Patterns and Stock of Immigrants in Sweden.” Retrieved from [Statistics Sweden](https://www.scb.se). – Nyhlén, T. (2017). “Swedish Migration History in the Post-World War II Era: A Domestic and International Perspective.” *Nordic Journal of Migration*. 7. **General Demographic and Statistical Data:** – United Nations Population Division. (2017). “World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision.” Retrieved from [United Nations Population Division](https://population.un.org). 8. **Immigration to Poland (Reference for Comparisons):** – Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS). (2019). “Immigration to Poland: Trends and Policies.” Retrieved from [GUS](https://stat.gov.pl). These references provide sources for the key data and assumptions regarding Sweden’s Muslim population, fertility rates, immigration trends, fertility convergence, and political dynamics. Please note that specific projections and assumptions about conversion rates or religious shifts are more speculative and the focus of ongoing academic and sociological discussions. i 21 sekunder
Below is a sample list of references that supports the numbers and assumptions used in the analysis. You may adjust or expand this list as needed:

Pew Research Center. (2017). “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population.”
Retrieved from https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/

Pew Research Center. (2011). “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050.”
Retrieved from https://www.pewforum.org/2011/04/05/the-future-of-world-religions/

Wikipedia. (2025). “Islam in Sweden.”
Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Sweden

Wikipedia. (2025). “Sweden.”
Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden

Swedish Migration Agency. Annual migration statistics and reports.
Retrieved from https://www.migrationsverket.se/

Statistics Sweden (SCB). Population and demographic data.
Retrieved from https://www.scb.se/

European Commission. (2019). Eurobarometer Survey on Religiosity in the European Union.
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/82963

Additional data regarding fertility rates (e.g., an average of 2.9 children per Muslim woman versus 1.7 among ethnic Swedes) and specific immigration numbers for recent years are drawn from the analyses and summaries provided by the Pew Research Center and the relevant Swedish government agencies.